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## BIECO project – Methodology for Security Evaluation

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- The problem
  - ICT components developed by third parties
  - Third party components: vulnerabilities? built with the best security practices?
  - vulnerabilities can propagate, high risk of cyber-attacks
  - vulnerabilities might remain undetected for years
  - ...even if they are well-known



- The idea
  - Create a framework that provides mechanisms to manage the security risks
  - Establish a common level of trust and security
  - Here comes the BIECO





- Main goal: deliver a framework for improving trust and security within ICT ecosystems
- There is a lot of background research behind the BIECO framework:
  - how we build on the existing standards, knowledge, vulnerability databases
  - how we translate general knowledge about software components to unified numerical results
  - Development of all the BIECO tools

If you are interested, check out <u>www.bieco.org</u> to learn all about it [1]

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### Methodology scheme (theory)

- Establishing the context: understanding the case
- **2. Risk identification**: finding our vulnerabilities

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- **3. Risk estimation:** gathering information from components
- **4. Risk evaluation:** understanding the impact of the risks
- **5. Treatment and labelling**: visualization and mitigation



From now on, we will go through *practical* side of the project

 how to use the BIECO tools and obtain security evaluation of your software component





### Methodology scheme (practice)

- That was the theory: establishing the background for creating the methodology
- In practice: we want to **use** the methodology, we use these tools
- think that was a model and this is the implementation



### **1. Establishing the context: Claims**

- Starting point:
  - What we should evaluate?
  - We create a set of claims against which the Target of Evaluation (TOE: a software component, etc.) will be assessed



### **1. Establishing the context: STRIDE categories**

• Each claim belongs to one of the STRIDE categories [3]

Threat	<b>Desired Security Property</b>
Spoofing	Authenticity
Tampering	Integrity
Repudiation	Non-repudiability
Information Disclosure	Confidentiality
Denial of Service	Availability
Elevation of Privilege	Authorization



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### **1. Establishing the context: Tolerance Profiles**

- Tolerance profiles:
  - To simplify the results and define where the highest risk is in our use case



### 2. Risk identification

### Decomposition of the system

- a way of describing the system and the relation between components claims, and tests...
- in a simple YAML file



## 2. Risk identification

### Let's visualise the output of the risk identification phase

System: Vehicle					
LEVEL 1	LEVEL 2	LEVEL 3	LEVEL 4	LEVEL5	
Security property (STRIDE)	Component (Sensitivity)	Claims (D7.1)	Vulnerabilities and Impact (for applicable claims <sup>1</sup> )	Tests	
Confidentiality	Multimedia ECU (7)	CO		TEST_00, TEST_07	
		C1		TEST_01	
	Controller (9)	C11		TEST_02, TEST_03	
		C32	CVE-2021-36988 / 7.5	TEST_04, TEST_05, TEST_06	
Integrity	Controller (9)				
	Database (8)				
	OBD (6)				
				- A	

### 2. Risk Identification – SafeTBox & ResilBlockly

- SafeTbox and ResilBlockly are tools that have been included into the BIECO risk estimation phase
- They are two risk modelling & analysis tools
- They were extended to cooperate with each other in creating a...
- Threat MUD file BIECO uses this file to represent the current state of analysis



### 2. Risk Identification – SafeTBox & ResilBlockly

ResilBlockly model example



### 2. Risk Identification – SafeTBox & ResilBlockly

ResilBlockly adding a weakness to a model's element

Functional analysis			cal	0
Block Create_Ack (Message)			16 attack pat	terns found.
1 weaknesses rela	Catalog	ID	Attack Patter	n
CWE-564 SQL Injection: I	CAPEC	CAPEC-108	Command Lin CWE-89	e Execution through SQL Injection
	CWE-74	0		
			CWE-20	0
			CWE-78	0
			CWE-114	0



### 2. Risk Identification – Risk Propagation Tool

- The main goal of the **propagation tool** is to find and indicate the components or elements a single vulnerability can affect, and therefore, its path within the system.
- For C, C++, Java, Python





### 2. Risk Identification – Security Testing

- The following tools are used to run real tests and produce files describing their results
- On the lowest level, each test passes, fails, or results in a specific value according to some metric:

Test result	Likelihood
PASS	0
FAIL	1
Specific metric	Metric weighted between 0 and 1

Safety metric	Criteria	
0	No injury.	
10	Light and moderate injuries.	
100	Severe and life-threatening injuries (survival probable).	
1000	Life-threatening injuries (survival uncertainty), fatal injuries	



### 2. Risk Identification – Security Testing - Graphwalker

- GraphWalker [4] an opensource tool, extended for the methodology by one of the BIECO partners, UMU
- Model-based testing tool: modelling the software as a graph of
  - Actions/transitions edges
  - Verifications/assertions vertices



### 2. Risk Identification – Security Testing – Fuzzing tool

- Fuzzing Tool:
  - Fuzzing process of finding security vulnerabilities in a service's interface by repeatedly sending requests with modified inputs
  - **dynamic analysis** against a real, working service



### 2. Risk Identification – Security Testing – GROOT

- GROOT [5]
  - GdpR-based cOmbinatOrial Testing
  - is a general combinatorial testing approach, for validating systems managing GDPR's concepts (e.g., Data Subject, Personal Data or Controller)
  - in general, the idea to perform automated analysis based on claims



### 3. Risk Estimation and 4. Risk Evaluation

- At this step, we have:
  - System description
  - Tolerance profiles
  - Security testing tools' results in various formats
- We have to combine all this information:
  - Parse
  - Unify
  - Create the internal representation of the system and relate the test (and results)
    - to specific claims
    - in specific components
    - in specific STRIDE categories
  - Evaluate the results and calculate numerical values of the risk
- This combines the ideas of the **Risk Estimation** and **Risk evaluation** phases



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### **3.** Risk Estimation and **4.** Risk Evaluation – Security Scorer

- All these actions are performed by SecurityScorer
- developed by 7bulls.com for the BIECO methodology



## 5. Labelling and treatment – BIECO GUI





### • BIECO is in progress

- This summer, we successfully instantiated the methodology, connecting all the tools presented today, integrated in the BIECO GUI
- We evaluated the first Use Case using complete methodology
- The background is prepared and formalized
- By the end of 2023, BIECO implementation should reach the final, easy-to-use in realworld scenario state





[1] <u>www.bieco.org</u>

[2] ECSO, "European Cyber Security Certification A Meta-Scheme Approach v1.0." 2017.

[3] Microsoft, "STRIDE chart | Microsoft Security Blog," 2007. https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2007/09/11/stride-chart/ (accessed Jul. 01, 2021).

[4] https://graphwalker.github.io/

[5] Daoudagh, S., Marchetti, E. (2022). GROOT: A GDPR-Based Combinatorial Testing Approach. In: Clark, D., Menendez, H., Cavalli, A.R. (eds) Testing Software and Systems. ICTSS 2021. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 13045. Springer, Cham. <u>https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04673-5\_17</u>





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# Thank you for watching

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